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THE LOGIC OF VILLAINY:
 
SHAKESPEARE'S USE OF THE FALLACIES
by Louis E. Dollarhide
When Moth tells Don Armado in Love's Labors Lost that
 
Samson was a man of “great carriage for he carried the town
 gates on his back like a porter,” the reader can easily recognize
 that the irrepressible page is using a logical turn; or when
 Touchstone proves by circuitous argument that Corin is damned
 because he has never been to court, the logical play is equally as
 obvious. 
This
 kind of witty jesting is characteristic of Shakes ­
pearean comedy. Not so obvious is the fact that when Richard
 III persuades Anne that she is accessory to his crimes, he mis
­leads her with one of the logical fallacies, or that when Iago
 persuades the gullible Moor that Desdemona is unfaithful, he
 traps Othello with a similar kind of sophistry. A close reading of
 the plays of Shakespeare shows that in drawing his witty
 villains, those characters like Richard III, Iago, and Edmund,
 who rise more by intellectual cunning than by force of arms,
 Shakespeare made conscious use of the logical fallacies as char
­acterizing devices. Furthermore, an examination of the logic of
 key speeches in plays other than those in which the great
 villains appear can give subtle evidence as to Shakespeare’s in
­tentions.
The fact that Shakespeare was trained in the art of logic is no
 
longer a matter of serious conjecture. From the exploratory
 work of Hardin Craig 1 to the more thorough studies of T. W.
 Baldwin2 and Sister Miriam Joseph,3 the extent of this know
­
1 Hardin Craig, “Shakespeare and Formal Logic,
”
 Studies in English Philology, A  
Miscellany in Honor of Frederick Klaeber, ed. Kemp Malone and M. B. Rand (Minne
­apolis, Minnesota, 1929), pp. 380-396.
2 T. W. Baldwin, William Shakespeare’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke, II, (Ur
­
bana, Illinois 1944).
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ledge 
has
 been amply demonstrated. More detailed studies of  
specific and meaningful 
uses
 of the arts of language in various  
aspects of Shakespearean drama have been made possible by the
 important work of these scholars. The purpose of this paper is
 to look into the patterns of sophistry as they are woven charac
­teristically by the great villains and, as a
 
ramification, to suggest  
how such an investigation can throw light on motivation and
 meaning 
in
 other plays and with other characters.4
4 Some of the material for this paper was taken from the writer’s doctoral study,
 
Shakespeare’s Richard III and Renaissance Rhetoric” (unpublished Ph.D. disserta
­tion, Department of English, 
University
 of North Carolina, 1954),
5Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason, Conteining the Arte of Logique (London,  
1552), V123-R124. A good modern discussion of the fallacies appears 
in
 Horace W.
B. Joseph, Introduction 
to
 Logic (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1916), pp. 566-596.
6E. K. Chambers, William Shakespeare, A Study of Facts and Problems (Oxford,  
1930), I, 
318.
In his Rule of
 
Reason, Thomas Wilson included a discussion  
of the fallacies, as he said, “even as Aristotle hath set them
 furth” in order to teach the unwary both to recognize and to
 confute them. Calling them “deceiptful” arguments or reprae-
 hensiones, he declared that “even in weightie matters, ye
 wicked have derived their subtle defenses from these deceiptful
 corners. . . .”5 As set down by Aristotle and repeated by logi
­cians since his time, the list of fallacies runs to thirteen—six
 subtleties in dictione, in the word, and seven subtleties in re, or
 material fallacies. The fallacies in dictione 
are
 all related in some  
way to 
forms
 of logical and rhetorical ambiguity. A word is  
used having more than one meaning. 
Things
 are joined which  
should be kept separated, or things belonging together are
 falsely divided. The material fallacies, on the other hand, be
­cause they derive from the substance or total statement rather
 than from the word, 
are
 more difficult to detect.
Except for the quality of “abstract villainy,” noted by E. K.
 Chambers,6 I find nothing in the rather crude, unconvincing portrait of Aaron in Titus Andronicus to connect him with the
 great villains of later plays. The study of masterful villainy 
in Shakespeare must begin with Richard III. Without attempting
 to catalogue all evidences of sophistry, 
we
 may observe that in  
his portrayal of Richard III, Shakespeare stresses two main
 
2





traits of thought—Richard’s persistent sophistry and his un
­
failing irony. Richard is, as Sister Joseph has observed, a
 “master of sophistic.”7 It is, therefore, suitable to the processes
 of his perverted wit that he take as his handbook “those places
 of crafte,” the fallacies. In his own play Richard alerts his
 audience to this kind of reasoning in his opening soliloquy,
 which is not an interior monologue but an oration delivered
 directly to the audience. The speech, 
in
 which Richard, in  
almost playful terms, explains why he must play the villain, is
 the amplification of a single hypothetical syllogism, as purpose
­fully false as Richard’s logic is to the end of the play:




 The Essays on Counsels Civil and Moral, ed. Melville B. Anderson  
(Chicago, 1892), pp. 216-217. See also Hardin Craig, An Interpretation of Shakes
­peare (New York, 1948), p. 69.
If a man is not shaped to play the lover,
 
he must play the villain.
Richard is not so shaped.
Therefore, Richard must prove a villain.
The fallacy, listed as the third material fallacy by Wilson, is
 
Secundum non causam, ut causam, the fallacy of trying to
 prove a matter by a cause which is not able to prove it.8 The
 fact that Richard uses an Elizabethan commonplace concerning
 deformity as his excuse for future villainy does not conceal the
 fallacy of his argument. In his essay “Of Deformity” Bacon
 states that the course which persons so afflicted must take 
in freeing themselves from “scorn must be either by virtue or
 malice.”9 For Richard there is only one way.
In scene after scene, episode after episode, Richard, the
 
“bottl’d spider,” weaves his web of sophistry. As a part of his
 ironies, he uses fallacies in dictione to tell shocking truths,
 which, though apparent to the audience, are concealed by am
­biguity from his victims. For example, when he tells his brother
 Clarence that he will deliver him from prison or else “lie” for
 him, Clarence is unaware of the double meaning of the term; or
 when he tells Anne at the end of his debate with her that his
 heart is “figur’d” in his tongue, Anne is not aware that the word
 
3
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can mean the placing of the middle term in a logical argument
 
as well as a setting forth or prefiguring.10 In the debate which
 goes before this statement Richard has overcome Anne with 
an argument whose validity depends on the truth of the middle
 term:
The “causer” (Anne) is as guilty as the “executioner”
 
(Richard).
Anne’s beauty is the “causer.”
Anne is, therefore, guilty of Richard’s crimes.
Technically Richard has “placed” the term correctly, according
 
to Wilson: that is, it appears first in the major premise and last
 in the minor; but the fallacy,11 the material fallacy of accident,
 lies in Richard’s proposing that Anne’s beauty is the efficient
 cause and then subtly passing from an adjunct (Anne’s beauty)
 to the subject (Anne herself) as if no breach of logic had been
 committed.
In his lengthier and more formal debate with Elizabeth in Act
 
IV, Richard finds himself pitted against an opponent who has
 almost as keen a wit as he has. Elizabeth successfully parries
 
every
 argument Richard can bring in until he is finally returned  
to the only basis of argument open to him—his professed re
­pentance and good intentions, probabilities, which by their
 
very  
nature are highly circumstantial and tentative. The trap into
 which Elizabeth falls is the sixth material fallacy according to
 Wilson 12— the fallacy of the consequent, ad posse ad esse, non
 est bona consequentia: because something is possible or
 probable, it does not follow that it 
will
 be so. Accepting these  
probabilities is, in effect, an act of placing faith in Richard’s
 character and word. All of Elizabeth’s experience, which is the
 only real argument she can offer in rebuttal, is against her doing
 so. And yet Richard swears his great oath “to prosper and re
­pent”; and as he presses home how necessary her daughter is to
 him, to Elizabeth herself, and to England, she is shown relenting
 and finally falling as others had fallen, victim to his sophistry.
Of Shakespeare’s later creations two of the greatest villains,
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 not, like Iago, Edmund, and Iachimo,  
progeny of Richard III. It is true that they must trade in appear
­ances and in slanders, but neither takes the delight in wrong
­doing that the witty villains do. Claudius and Macbeth must do
 terrible things to save themselves, but they suffer in conscience
 for their sins long before retribution overtakes them. And the
 kind of wit which Richard passes on to his successors is not part
 of their composition. While not developed as fully as Richard
 himself, the true heirs of Richard III are Iago, Edmund, and a
 late character in Cymbeline, Iachimo.
The chief difference between Richard III and these later
 
villains is the fact that none of them has opponents as strong as
 Richard has and consequently none is forced to rely on his wits
 to the extent that Richard is. He must persuade Anne and Eliza
­beth and the English populace who are at enmity with him from
 the first; they must delude Othello and Gloucester and Posthu
­mous Leonatus, who suspect them of no wrongdoing. Only
 Iachimo has to gather evidence and argue a case. Iago and
 Edmund work on characters who are either credulous or too
 noble to suspect that evil can lie in the heart of another man.
 Except for an occasional use of a fallacy in dictione, the pattern
 of persuasion which these later
 
villains use rests primarily on the  
fallacy of accident. Almost invariably their proofs are related to
 the problem of seeming and being, a distinction which Hamlet
 clearly states when 
he
 reproves his mother for the use of the  
word “seems” in referring to his grief: “Seems, Madam! I know
 not ‘seems.’ ” These outward things, such as his “suit of solemn
 black” and the “windy suspirations of forc’
d
 breath,” are mere  
adjuncts or accidents to the reality of his grief. On the basis of
 this distinction between seeming and being, the villains work.
 Iago announces in Scene i, “I am not what I am.” In his first
 soliloquy, like Richard III, he attempts to justify or explain his
 later villainy; and like Richard, he uses the fallacy of trying to
 prove a matter by a cause which is not able to prove it. He 
has been passed over for Cassio. He suspects that Othello has cuck
­olded him, and for mere suspicion he will act. In persuading
 Roderigo, his first gull, that Desdemona will tire of Othello, he
 bases his argument on the fallacy of accident, making the “acts
5
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of courtesy” between her and Cassio appear in the worst
 
possible light as but “prologue to the history of lust.” In the
 same way with Othello, he adds accident to accident until
 Othello in agony exclaims “this denoted a foregone con
­clusion.” From there on each bit of added evidence serves only
 as substantiation until Othello’s “occupation” is indeed 
gone.
In like manner, Edmund plays upon his credulous father and
 
his noble brother. Gloucester is easily duped by the forged
 letter, even though Edmund must authenticate the handwriting,
 and by slanders which Edmund speaks openly. 
With
 Edgar the  
course is simpler; he has only to frighten him away. In similar
 fashion he dupes Goneril and Regan, separately, into thinking
 he is in love with them. lachimo, the Iago-like schemer of
 Cymbeline, sets out to prove that Imogen is faithless. To do
 this, he cynically tries to win Imogen by reporting to her that
 Leonatus is a reveller and then offering himself as a means of
 revenge. When he is repulsed, realizing that Imogen is as chaste
 as her husband believes her to be, he must resort to subterfuge
 to make her appear to be false. Gaining access to her bed
­chamber by concealing himself in a trunk, he goes about making
 note of accidents with which to prove her false—the details of
 the room, the bracelet from Imogen’s arm, and finally the mole
 on her breast. When he reports to Leonatus that she is false, the
 husband refutes the evidence of the room as proof; he is shaken
 by sight of the bracelet, but he accepts Iachimo’s knowledge of
 the mole as proof
 
positive of Imogen’s guilt. Leonatus is not the  
easy mark that the victims of Iago and Edmund are, but in the  
end he is hoodwinked by the same kind of circumstantial evi
­dence, based on the fallacy of accident, which had misled the
 other characters.
Beyond the villains themselves, Shakespeare found the falla
­
cies useful in indicating motivation and dramatic intention in
 the creation of such deluded or self-deluded characters as Bru
­tus, Othello, and King 
Lear.
 This fact is illustrated clearly  
enough in the person of Brutus. In spite of his apparent sym
­pathy for Brutus, Shakespeare gives sufficient clues in the play
 to leave no doubt as to his attitude toward the part of Brutus in
 the conspiracy. An early clue is Cassius’ short Richard-like com-
6
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ment on the way Brutus has responded to his own suggestion of
 
revolt against Caesar:
Thou, Brutus, thou art noble; yet, I see,
 
Thy honourable metal may be wrought
 From that it is disposed. . . .
But the clearest indication of Shakespeare’s intentions is in the
 
speech of self-justification which Brutus makes in Act II. Alone
 in his garden, awaiting the arrival of his fellow conspirators,
 Brutus considers the step they are about to take. “It must be by
 his death,” he begins. He has no “personal cause” to bring
 against Caesar; what he and his fellow conspirators are about to
 do is for the general good. Although Caesar has that day three
 times rejected a crown, Brutus is certain that he wants to be
 king. He announces the matter for deliberation, “How that
 might change him, there’s the question.” His manner of
 development in the confirmatio or proof of his speech is to
 begin with a proverb (in logic a matter of common human
 experience) and apply the truism to the matter under delibera
­tion: “It is the bright day that brings forth the adder,” “Th’
 abuse of greatness is when it disjoins / Remorse from power,” “lowliness is young Ambition’s ladder / Whereto the climber-
 upward turns his face. ...” But the sententiae merely throw a
 coloring of truth over the basic fallacy of Brutus’ whole argu
­ment, and their use in this instance amounts to a secondary
 fallacy, that of Secundum Quid.13 The basic fallacy, which the
 sententiae do not hide, lies in the fact that the proof
 
rests on a  
probability: Caesar “might” change; he “may” do danger; “So
 Caesar may; / Then, lest he may, prevent.” But Brutus admits
 that this probability, on which he tries and finally executes his
 friend, is against his own experience:
to speak truth of Caesar,
 
I have not known when his affection sway’d
 
More
 than his reason.
But in spite of the inadequate basis of his proof, he concludes
 that he will think of Caesar as a “serpent’s egg,”
13 Ibid. ,R150-V151.
7
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Which,
 hatch’d, would, as his kind, grow mischievous,  
And kill him in the shell.
Having convinced himself that 
Caesar
 is the figurative un ­
hatched serpent, Brutus no longer looks back. The whole basis
 of 
his
 self-justification rests on the fallacy of the consequent.
Although he is a dupe of one of the great villains and their
 relationship commented upon above, Othello deserves indivi
­dual comment because of the nature of the change in his
 character between Acts I and III. As he is shown in the first act,
 particularly in his great speech before the Senate, Othello is a
 master of the arts of language. His defense is so nobly stated, he
 is so completely in control of
 
himself and the situation that the  
Duke must say, “I think this tale would win my daughter too.”
 Even after his composure is shattered by Iago’s insinuations, he
 makes one last effort in Act III, Scene iii, to see his plight
 rationally. “Villain, be sure you prove my love a whore,” he
 tells Iago. “I’
ll
 have some proof,” he says. “Give me a living  
reason she’s disloyal.” But it is already too late. Sure of his
 prey, Iago has pronounced over him 
his
 diabolical charm, “Not  
poppy, nor mandragora, / Nor all the drowsy syrups of the
 world. ...” Demanding proof, Othello ends by accepting as
 conclusive evidence a purported dream and his wife’s handker
­chief, which he had himself thrust from Desdemona’s hand only
 a few moments earlier. And on this flimsy basis, he tries and
 executes the one person in the world he loves. The contrast
 between the measured 
logic
 of Othello’s early appearance and  
the shattered un-reason of his mental processes at the climax of
 the play serves to accentuate the tragic decline of the heroic
 Moor.
And so with other characters. Blinded by jealousy like
 
Othello, Leontes in The Winter’s Tale acts as his own Iago. He
 distorts Hermione’s entertainment of Polixines into “paddling
 palms and pinching fingers,” and misconstrues Camillo’s inno
­cent statements about Hermione to mean that he has already
 been cuckolded. From mere accidents he leads himself
 
into de ­
manding, like Othello, the death of his best freind and his be
­loved wife. In King Lear, the old king’s vanity contest is made
 to seem even more fatuous by the fact that he accepts testi
­mony rather than experience as evidence of love. When the
8
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truth at last strikes home, he must cry, “O most small fault, /
 
How ugly didst thou in Cordelia show!” And in Much Ado
 About Nothing, Claudio and Don Pedro are misled by Don
 John, a progeny of Richard III briefly sketched in a context of
 comedy. In spite of their previous knowledge of him, they per
­mit themselves to be trapped by his “proof” of Hero’s infi
­delity. They accept appearances without further investigation.
 Benedict and Beatrice, on the other hand, steadfastly refuse to
 be misled. Borachio says Claudio and Don Pedro were deceived
 partly by Don John’s oaths, partly by the dark night, but
 “chiefly by my villainy which did confirm any slanders that
 Don John had made.” But they were misled. And on the basis
 of mere appearances, they disgrace an innocent girl.
Having established the pattern of villainous thought 
in
 his  
first great emblem of wickedness, Richard III, Shakespeare con
­tinued the same pattern with variations in Iago, Edmund, and
 Iachimo. In addition, he made use of the fallacies to give his
 audience subtle clues as to meaning and motivation in the por
­trayal of erring, though sympathetic, characters like Brutus. An
 examination of his use of the logical fallacies can, in effect, add
 a new dimension to our understanding of his plays.
9
Dollarhide: The Logic of Villainy: Shakespeare’s Use of the Fallacies
Published by eGrove, 1969
